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Abstract 
The economic theory of the firm offers conflicting predictions of how the two major effects of 
recessions, i.e. changes in demand and access to credit, affect firm boundaries. Using data on 
Norwegian firms in the recent recession, we find support for both increased and reduced 
vertical integration of core activities in response to such changes. Further, we find that access 
to credit negatively moderates the effect of reductions in demand on vertical integration. The 
latter finding may highlight a possible explanation for the conflicting theoretical predictions. 
2
 1. Introduction 
Economic crises influence the business environment in ways that require many firms to adjust 
their type and level of activities. In this paper we explore the influence of the economic crises 
on firm boundary decisions. Two central features of economic crises are reductions in demand 
and reductions in access to credit. These are relevant in most recessions, but firms may 
experience them in different degrees and different combinations (Tong & Wei, 2008). The 
questions we pose are how do reduction in demand and reduction in access to credit affect 
firm boundary decisions? We address these questions using the theory of economic 
organization (aka the economic theory of the firm), as this theory explicitly addresses the 
issues of firm boundaries.  
Within the economics branch of the theory of the firm there is a common understanding of 
transaction costs as the factor that explains both the existence and boundaries of firms. Much 
of the research has centered on identifying the different variables that cause costs of carrying 
out a particular transactions to be higher in markets relative to within firms (e.g. Hart, 1995; 
Williamson, 1975; Williamson, 1985). Taking the transaction as the unit of analysis, changes 
in firm boundaries has been analyzed in terms of changes at either the firm level or in the 
relations between firms. Thus, research has not focused much on how changes in the macro 
environment impact on firms’ boundary decisions. However, this does not imply that the 
macro environment is completely absent in the theory of the firm as all economic 
explanations of the existence and boundaries of firms emphasize uncertainty (Coase, 1937; 
Williamson, 1996) as a necessary condition for firm organization. Changes in the level of 
uncertainty impact the choice between firm and market organization. For example, 
Williamson, argue that increases in the number and severity of disturbances push transactions 
from market governance toward firm governance1. Likewise, Coase (1937) points out that 
uncertainty increases as the time horizon of transactions increase. A higher level of 
uncertainty implies more adaptations of transactions to unforeseen changes and those 
adaptations may more easily be carried out within the boundaries of a firm. Some later work 
on the theory of the firm has included more specific macro determinants of the boundaries of 
1 Of course, “disturbances” are in general important to causing “hold-up” (Williamson, 1996). 
 
3
the firm, notably technology and the law (e.g. Milgrom & Roberts, 1995; Williamson, 1991).  
However, there have been no analyzes of how firms gradually adjust their boundaries to 
changes in the level of demand they face or in their access to capital for financing their 
investments, although these clearly are variables that affect business transactions.   
The approach we take in this paper is to identify how an economic crisis indirectly influences 
firm decisions to out- or insource activities. Thus, we use the economic theory of the firm to 
identify the transaction and firm level variables that explain firm boundaries. We then ask 
how a reduction in the demand firms face and constraints in access to credits may impact on 
the variables that explain firm boundaries. We do not measure the impact of the economic 
crises on the explanatory variables. Instead we derive hypothesis regarding the consequences 
on firm boundary decisions of the likely changes in the explanatory variables. We then test 
the extent to which the economic crises have produced the predicted changes in firm 
boundaries in terms of firms’ in- or outsourcing of activities.    
The field of economic organization reveals different positions regarding the nature of firms 
and the coordination problems they solve. These different positions hold different views on 
what is the core rationale for the existence of firms and what determine the efficient 
boundaries of firms. An important difference among the various approaches is their emphasis 
on asset specificity in transactions as a necessary condition for transactions to be organized in 
firms.  Coase, who is the founding father of economic theory of the firm, argues that asset 
specificity is not a necessary condition (Coase, 1991) whereas Williamson(1975; 1985; 1986; 
1991) and others (e.g. Grossman & Hart, 1986; Hart, 1991, 1995; Hart & Moore, 1990; Klein, 
1986; Klein, Crawford, & Alchian, 1978) stresses its importance in determining firm 
organization of transactions. We focus our attention on the Coasian view of the theory of the 
firm and on the Williamson view as representatives of different approaches an economic 
theory of the firm.  
The Coasian and Williamson transaction cost theories lead to some conflicting hypothesis 
regarding the impact of reduction in demand on firms’ decision to in- or outsource activities. 
Our results indicate that firms both in- and out-source activities and that they do so in patterns 
that are predicted by both of the conflicting hypothesis. Thus, one interpretation may be that 
in- and out sourcing as a response to an economic crisis may to some extent be explained by 
the Coasian view and to some extent by the Williamson view of the theory of the firm. 
Another interpretation is that the economic crisis did not influence the central explanatory 
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variables in the ways we expected and for that reason our hypothesis do not capture the exact 
causal influence of an economic crisis on firm boundaries. More empirical work will be 
needed in order to better understand the impact of an economic crisis on firm boundary 
decisions. However, we also found that firms’ access to credit may have an important 
influence on firms boundary decisions as access to credit influence the extent to which firms 
are able to finance in-sourcing of activities. Empirically we find that the likelihood of 
insourcing was negatively influenced by the interaction effect between reduction in demand 
and reductions in access to credit. The interaction effect may in part explain why our 
contradictory hypotheses were confirmed as this finding may indicate that reductions in 
demand increases firms’ incentives to vertically integrate core activities, while their ability to 
actually do so depend on their access to credit. More importantly the interaction effect 
indicates that financial market may be important in influencing economic organization. This 
aspect of the macro environment is not explicitly dealt with in the economic theory of the 
firm.  
The paper is structured as follows. First we discuss economic theory of the firm with 
particular focus on the Coasian and the Transaction Cost Perspective, and use these to develop 
hypotheses regarding the effect of changes in demand and credit on firms’ boundary choices. 
Then we present data and measurement procedures, before presenting the empirical findings 
of our analyses. We close the paper with conclusions, implications and suggestions for future 
research. 
 
2. Theory and Hypotheses 
2.1 Economic theories of the firm 
Economic theories of the firm can be grouped into three different positions that reflect 
differences regarding the nature of firms and the coordination problems they solve. These 
positions may broadly be characterized as the “Coasian perspective, (Coase, 1937)” the 
“Transaction Cost perspective, (e.g. Klein, 1986; Klein et al., 1978; Williamson, 1975; 1985; 
1986; 1991) and the “Property Rights perspective (e.g. Grossman & Hart, 1986; Hart, 1991, 
1995; Hart & Moore, 1990). The different contributions to the theory of the firm share the –
sometimes-implicit – assumption that if complete contingent markets had existed, price 
coordination between independent agent and asset owners would suffice and there would be 
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no firms. The different contributions also have in common the notion that it is the 
combination of uncertainty and transaction costs that explains why complete contingent 
markets do not exist and why firms exist to fill the void of the price system. The Coasian and 
the Transaction cost perspectives represents those perspectives that most explicitly view firms 
as a distinct governance structures that handles coordination and incentives differently than 
markets whereas the property rights perspective perceive firms as a distinct ownership pattern. 
In the following we use the Coasian and the Transaction Costs branches of the theory of the 
firm to develop testable hypotheses on the impact of the economic crisis on firms’ decisions 
to out- or insource activities. These two branches are best suited for an analysis of the impact 
of a crisis on firm boundaries as they have a broader view of the role of firms in markets as 
well as a boarder view of uncertainty compared to the Property Rights perspective.  
 
2.1.1 The Coasian Perspective on the Firm  
Coase (1937) argue that firms exist because of transaction costs. According to Coase, 
transaction costs are ‘the costs of using the price mechanism’ where the ‘[m]ost obvious cost 
of “organizing” production through the price mechanism is that of discovering what the 
relevant prices are’ (Ibid, 1937: 21). The cost of discovering the relevant price increase with 
uncertainty as unforeseeable changes in demand and supply may change the relative value 
(opportunity cost) of different courses of actions. However, economic agents are forward-
looking, and may anticipate that future changes will take place that will make it desirable to 
adapt contractual relations. Uncertainty alone does not explain why firms exist. There must 
also be costs of negotiation and concluding a separate contract since otherwise it would be 
costless to adaptation contractual relations to changes as they materialize.  
In his original paper Coase argue that the cost of re-negotiations increase with increased 
frequency of activities that will have to be adapted in term of e.g. time and place of execution. 
As an example, Coase (1937) mentions the use of secretary services. However, in an 
amendment to his original paper Coase (1991) remarks that a full firm-type relationship ‘will 
not come about unless several such [incomplete] contracts are made with people and for 
things which cooperate with one another’ (ibid: 64). This amendment implies that costs of re-
contracting across markets also increase when economic activities are characterized by strong 
degrees of interdependencies (Thompson, 1967).   
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Firms emerge as a substitute to contractual renegotiation as managerial directions substitute 
for the use of the price mechanism. An activity will be performed internally in a firm if the 
costs associated with doing so are lower than the costs of using the market, and the overall 
outcome of this trade-off result in an optimal division of labor between firms and markets 
(Slater, 2003).  
The cost of using firm organization is of a different nature than the costs of using markets. 
Within firms costs of using managerial direction stems mainly from the ‘increasing 
opportunity costs due to the failure of entrepreneurs to make the best use of the factor of 
production’ (Coase, 1937: 23). For example, Coase (1937) argued that the cost of using 
managerial direction increase ‘with an increase in the spatial distribution of transactions 
organized, in the dissimilarity of the transactions, and in the probability of changes in the 
relevant prices’ (ibid: 25). Finally, Coase also mentions that changes in relevant prices 
increase the costs of internal organizations. It is unclear how changes in relevant market 
prices influence the costs of internal organization. However, if an economy experiences 
changes in relative prices managers may have to  form new judgments on what are the best 
(non-priced) uses of the particular labor services and inputs over which they hold managerial 
discretion. Thus, changes in relative prices increase the risk of making managerial mistakes. 
Managers, in other words, have limited capacity to ‘discover the relevant prices’ and these 
limitations are challenged as they have to deal with change and diversity in activities (cf. also 
Penrose, 1959; Richardson, 1972). 
Coase’s framework is very general and it is difficult to specify and measure the costs 
associated with using either markets or firm organization. Williamson (1975, 1985) and others 
have extended Coase’s insights into a more specific theory of transaction costs that are easier 
to operationalize.  
 
2.1.2 The Transaction Cost Perspective  
Williamson (1975, 1985) laid the foundation for the ‘transaction costs branch’ of economic 
organization. According to Williamson, markets fail to produce the proper incentives for 
investments when economic agents face a combination of uncertainty and high asset 
specificity in their investments. The transaction cost perspective rests on two fundamental 
behavioral assumptions, namely the bounded rationality- and opportunistic behavior of 
economic actors (Williamson, 1985). Bounded rationality means that economic agents are 
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intentionally rational, but due to imperfect information and limited cognitive capacity, they 
are not able to make perfectly rational choices. Therefore, agents cannot predict the future 
even if they have access to all available information, and they can make mistakes.  However, 
agents are aware of their own limitations, and this will influence their actions and choices. 
Opportunism, on the other hand, is defined by Williamson as “self-interest with guile”, 
implying that economic agents are willing to cheat and break contracts if it is in their interest 
to do so.  
Transactions differ with regard to; the degree of asset specificity (assets that have a lower 
value outside- than in the transaction); level of uncertainty; and frequency. The efficient 
organization of a transaction is determined by these three characteristics. The level of asset 
specificity positively influence vertical integration as the quasi rents on the investment will be 
lost if the transaction is terminated. Uncertainty, affects vertical integration decisions by 
making contracts incomplete as tools for adapting to environmental changes that influence the 
value creation in the transaction. The kind of environmental uncertainty that causes contracts 
to be incomplete is not very clearly spelled out in the work of Williamson but he does argue 
that environment uncertainty makes sequential adaptation of the contractual relation 
economically efficient. Such adaptation may give rise to contractual disputes, which 
ultimately will have to be settled by courts. Court settlements of disputes may not be efficient 
as bounded rationality apply not just to contractual partners, but also to courts. For example, 
courts may be unaware of the exact reasons why either of the parties to a transaction may 
want changes to be made in contracts. Thus, courts may allow contrived cancelation of 
contracts. This is particular important when courts are dealing with disputes involving 
transaction- specific investments as it makes a hold-up of the firm that has made the 
transaction specific investment possible (e.g. Masten, 1991; Vandenberghe & Siegers, 2000; 
Williamson, 1985).  
Within firms the exercise of managerial discretion substitutes dispute resolution by courts. In 
fact, Williamson (1996: 27) describes a firm as ‘its own court of ultimate appeal’ and  
perceives the firm as a governance structure that is supported by a legal frame of employment 
law and forbearance (Masten, 1991). Similar to Coase (1937) Williamson also compare the 
cost of market transaction with the cost of internal organization but he stresses that the costs 
of internal organization mainly arise from lack of proper incentives. Thus, firm governance is 
limited by rising agency costs and by ‘the impossibility of selective intervention’ 
(Williamson, 1985). The impossibility of selective intervention refers to the idea that 
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managers cannot commit to intervene in decentralized decisions where the intervention is for 
the benefit to the entire organization (Williamson, 1985). Thus, managers intervene for 
private interests or on behalf of units that use their specific information and position to 
influence managers’ decisions (Foss, Foss, & Vázquez, 2006).  
Holding cost of internal organization constant across all type of transactions, the transaction 
cost perspective predicts that vertical integration increase with increased uncertainty, higher 
degrees of asset specificity and higher levels of frequency. Frequency relates positively to the 
decision to vertically integrate as the fixed costs of setting up a firm governance structure for 
the transaction is spread over more transactions. 
 
2.2 Firm Boundaries and Recessions 
There are two important ways in which crises impact on firm boundaries. One is through 
changes in demand for firms’ products and services and the other is through capital market 
imperfections that reduce access to or increase cost of credit. In the following, we derive 
hypothesis regarding the impact of these two factors on firms’ decisions to change their 
boundaries by in-or outsource activities.  
 
2.2.1 The Impact of Reductions in Demand on Firms’ Boundary Decisions.  
Reductions in demand leave firms with two options. Either they can keep their (now 
inefficient) level of capacity and wait until the demand adjusts back to ‘normal levels’ or they 
can alter their capacity according to the new level of demand. The latter includes the option of 
outsourcing some of the activities to suppliers and let the supplier be a buffer for changes in 
demand.  
The effect of reduction in demand is not explicitly treated in the works of either Coase or 
Williamson. However, both theories provide some insights into how firm boundary choices 
are influenced by increases in demand. In such a setting the (increased number) of 
transactions that the firm must undertake to service a growing demand may raises cost of 
market renegotiations (Coase, 1937), as well as raise transaction frequency above threshold 
levels to be internalized in the firm (Williamson, 1985). We may thus expect reduction in 
demand to negatively mirror the changes we expect from increases in demand. However, the 
growth and decline of firm boundaries need not be symmetric processes as expansion entails 
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sunk cost investments in physical assets and knowledge. Nevertheless, we can gain some 
insights to firms’ reaction to decreasing demand by examining what types of transactions 
firms are likely to internalize during their path of expansion.  
In the Coasian perspective, substituting many market transactions with managerial direction 
reduce cost of renegotiation contracts (Coase, 1991; Foss, 2010) and firms expand their 
boundaries as increased demand increases their need for re-contracting for labor and other 
type input increases. However, we should expect firms to first internalize those transactions 
where adaptations of contracts are anticipated and where the cost of making these adaptations 
across markets are the most costly. This point to the internalization of transaction among input 
factors that are characterized by strong interdependencies. Moreover, in order for firms to 
ensure low cost of coordination, managers must have a cognitive capacity based e.g. on 
relevant experience and expertise. Thus, coordination of strongly interdependent transactions, 
which require similar kind of experience, should be the core of the firm’s activities. Firms 
keep expanding their boundaries until the marginal cost of doing so exceed the marginal 
benefits. As demand grows firms may engage in an increasing number of transactions for 
inputs, which are not strongly interdependent with the core activities. For example, firms with 
core activities in production of goods may internalize the running of a cantina to reduce cost 
of re-contracting for this type of services. When demand decline we should expect firms to 
first out-source the marginal transactions. These transactions would be those that are not 
within the core of the firm’s activities and which at high levels of re-contracting are only 
marginally less costly to coordinate within the boundary of the firm. In sum, we should expect 
firms to adapt their boundaries to decrease in demand by primarily outsourcing non-core 
activities. 
The transaction cost perspective also explains firm growth as partly related to the level of 
frequency of transactions. For transaction frequencies above a threshold level firms should 
internalize all transactions that are characterized by high levels of asset specificity to avoid 
the potential hold-up problems. In a market of growing demand more and more different type 
of transactions may reach the threshold level were internalization becomes an attractive 
alternative to market transactions. With growing demand we should expect firms to 
increasingly internalize transactions characterized by medium or even low level of asset 
specificity. When demand decline and the frequency of transactions are reduced, vertically 
integrated transactions with medium or low levels of asset specificity becomes too expensive 
to sustain within the boundary of a firm. Thus, we should expect firms to adapt their 
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boundaries to decreases in demand by primary out-sourcing the non-core activities 
(transaction with low level of asset specificity) as these transactions may then fall below the 
threshold. Based on the above discussion, we therefore suggest the following hypothesis:  
H1: Reductions in demand are positively related to outsourcing of non-core activities. 
 
For transactions involving higher levels of asset specificity and/or high level of 
complementarity among transactions, the theoretical predictions regarding reductions in 
demand are less clear. These (core) transactions are less likely to be affected by changes in the 
frequency of transactions. Instead both the Coasian and transaction cost perspective indicate 
that changes in the level of uncertainty influence how such (core) transactions are organized.  
Both perspectives emphasize that environmental uncertainty makes contracts incomplete 
introducing a need for sequential adaptation of transactions. Thus, increases in the level of 
uncertainty (all else equal) may make more transactions fall within the category of core-
transactions. In accordance with both the Coasian perspective and the transaction cost 
perspective, we should expect firms to internalize more transactions as uncertainty increase. 
Neither the Coasian nor the transaction cost perspective explicitly discusses the kind of 
environmental uncertainty that may cause firms to internalize transactions. However, a sudden 
decrease in demand along with the uncertainty surrounding the emergence of a new 
equilibrium of demand may cause firms to expect more adaptation of transactions. For core-
type transaction characterized by interdependencies or asset specificity adaptations may be 
less costly within firm boundaries.  
In the transaction cost perspective uncertainty also has a behavioral component, which stems 
from the inclination of economic actors to act opportunistically. Also, behavioral uncertainty 
may increase with reductions in demand because the structure of supplier and buyer markets 
may change as more firms go bankrupt during recessions. Thus, some firms that have high 
sunk cost investments may all of a sudden find themselves in a small number bargaining 
situation. This is a setting that increase proclivity of suppliers or buyers to act opportunistic 
and hold up the firm (Klein, Crawford, & Alchian, 1978).  
Thus far we have argued that both the Coasian and the transaction cost perspective predicts 
that decreases in demand  (giving rise to higher uncertainty) increases firms incentives to 
integrate vertically, but it is not given that the firms will actually do so. Williamson (1986) 
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argues that firms face two different solutions to situations with increased behavioral- or 
environmental uncertainty. Firstly, they can integrate vertically by increasing governance 
efforts related to the transaction, or secondly, they can start using market governance by 
sacrificing specificity in favor of more standardized investments. Which one of these 
responses firms will choose is difficult to predict. This is also reflected in the ambiguous 
findings in the literature related to the effect of uncertainty on firms’ boundary decisions.  
In a literature review, David and Han (2004) found that the empirical evidence regarding the 
effect of uncertainty on firms’ boundary decisions was inconsistent as there was almost as 
much evidence of uncertainty causing less integration as there was empirical evidence 
suggesting the opposite relationship predicted by transaction cost economics. Shelanski and 
Klein (1995) suggest that this inconsistency can be explained by “confusion” in the treatment 
of uncertainty as a factor that raises transaction costs. Several studies, they write, treat 
uncertainty as an independent variable without including measures of asset specificity. Doing 
so may give misleading results as uncertainty only affects transactions with a significant 
presence of relation specific investments (Williamson, 1985). Another possible explanation 
could be that firms’ in some situations prefer to sacrifice specificity and use market 
governance. However, even though the empirical evidence of whether or not firms actually 
integrate vertically as a response to increased uncertainty is somewhat ambiguous, it seems 
clear that the reductions in demand will positively influence firms’ incentives to take actions 
regarding the governance of its core-activities, either in the form of increased vertical 
integration or by sacrificing specificity and increase their outsourcing. Thus, it follows that 
recessions are positively related to both out- and insourcing decisions, which makes us 
suggest the following hypotheses: 
H2: Reductions in demand is positively related to outsourcing of core activities. 
H3: Reductions in demand is positively related to insourcing of core activities. 
 
2.2.2 The effect of a decrease in access to credit on firm boundaries.  
The other major characteristic of an economic crisis is the shortage of risk willing capital. The 
shortage of capital is in fact a decrease in the supply of capital for financing transactions 
(credits) and investments leading to higher costs of carrying out transactions and investments.  
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Again, we find no explicit treatments in either Coasian, or in the transaction cost perspective 
of how cost of financing transactions influence firms’ boundary choice. The implicit 
assumption seems to be that if a transaction is efficient it will be financed and the cost of 
financing it is independent of whether it is internalized or conducted across markets. 
However, in both perspectives we find that the explanatory variables can be influenced by the 
cost of financing transactions allowing for an indirect influence on firm boundary choice. 
Starting with non-core activities, we expect that an increase in cost of short-term credit 
increase the cost of carrying out those transactions where such credits are important. As the 
average total cost of a transaction increase we should expect fewer transactions to be carried 
out. This effect, we expect, does not differ depending on the transaction being carried out 
within a firm or across a market. Thus, there is no theoretical reason why problems of 
accessing credit should affect the decision to in- or out-source non-core activities. We will, on 
the other hand, expect that the in- and outsourcing decisions related to transactions 
characterized as core activities are affected by higher costs of finance.  
The transaction cost perspective directs attention to the influence that cost of finance has on 
the choice between transaction specific investments and general type investments. The cost of 
finance increase with increasing riskiness of investments and this is true for internalized as 
well as for market transactions. However, transactions involving specific assets are considered 
to be more risky than general type investments and perhaps even more so during an economic 
crisis (when environmental and behavioral uncertainty increase). The implication is that 
transaction specific investments become relatively more costly compared to general type 
investments that may turn the latter in to inefficient investments and make more transactions 
market based. Now, while these argument seems to effect only those firms that are about to 
make new investments, they may in fact also have an impact on firms that have already 
invested in transaction specific assets as these investments may also become inefficient with 
rising cost of re-financing the investment. Thus, some firms may decide to write-off the loss 
from the sunk cost investment and invest in the general type asset.  
The Coasian (1937, 1991) perspective directs attention to the influence that cost of finance 
has on the cost of making managerial mistakes. According to Coase (1937), the cost of 
organizing transactions within the boundary of a firm increase with increasing managerial 
mistake, and making the wrong (inefficient) investment is one of the possible mistakes that 
managers can make. When cost of finance increase, it increases the cost of managerial 
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mistakes.2 Increased cost of managerial mistakes change the point where the marginal 
benefits exceed the marginal cost of internalizing transactions. The implication is that a 
reduction in access to credit is positively related to outsourcing of core activities for firms. 
Thus, we suggest the following hypothesis: 
H4: Reductions in access to credit is positively related outsourcing of core activities 
 
As with reductions in demand, there are theoretical arguments implying that a reduction in 
access to credit also may work in the opposite direction by being positively related to in-
sourcing of core activities. Based on the Coasian perspective we can argue that managers’ 
ability to assess the efficiency of an investment depend on their firm specific experience. In 
particular, managers may have informational advantages compared to outside agents that stem 
from their experience with the core-activities of their firms (experience that is unique to the 
core activities of the particular firm) (Foss, 2010). The implication is that for core firm 
activities managers are more likely to decide on the efficient investments compared to outside 
agents. Thus, relying on market transaction may sometimes imply forgoing efficient 
investments as outside agents are unable to fully assess the cost and benefits of these 
investments. With an increase in the cost of finance managers’ informational advantage 
become more important as many efficient investments in firm core activities will only be 
undertaken if the transaction internalized. Based on these arguments we suggest the following 
hypothesis:   
H5: Reductions in access to credit is positively related to insourcing of core activities  
 
2.2.3 Interaction effects of reductions in demand- and access to credit.  
Building on the above argumentation, the effect of reductions in demand and in access to 
credits are somewhat ambiguous as firms can respond either by integrating vertically or by 
outsourcing  an activity to the market. Reduction in demand and increased cost of finance 
both pull investment from transaction specific to more general type investments thus 
reinforcing one another in causing firms to outsource. However, reduction in demand and 
2 For example, Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) argue that higher interest rates may induce investors to undertake more 
risky projects as they do carry all the risk of failure. Our argument is different as it relies on the uncertainty that 
managers face with respect to assessing the payoff from investment projects. Holding the portfolio of investment 
project constant, higher cost of finance implies that investment failures become more costly to the firm.   
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increased cost of finance also reinforce one another in causing firms to insource activities. 
That is decrease in demand increase environmental and behavioral uncertainty thus puling 
toward insourcing of activities. Increased cost of finance may increase the importance of 
market imperfections in capital market and likewise pull toward more insourcing of activities.  
However, reduction in access to capital may also increase cost of finance to the extent where 
efficient investment cannot be financed. Thus, while it may be efficient for a firm to respond 
to reductions in demand by insourcing an activity, it needs to finance the vertical integration 
either internally or externally. So, while the incentives to vertically integrate may be strong 
the ability to do so depends on firms’ access to capital that can finance the integration. More 
specifically, a reduction in access to credit should negatively moderate the effect of reduced 
demand on insourcing of core activities. Based on the above argumentation, we therefore 
suggest the following hypothesis: 
H6: There is a negative interaction effect between reductions in demand and –access 
to credit on insourcing of core activities 
 
3. Data and Methods 
3.1 Data and Sample 
The recent financial crisis and subsequent recession was weaker in Norway than in other 
western economies, but substantial enough to constitute a sharp treatment effect on the 
Norwegian firms. Between 2007 and 2009, GDP growth in Norway dropped from 2.7 to -1.5 
per cent, growth in gross capital investments dropped from 16.1 to -7 per cent in 2009 and the 
number of bankruptcies increased with 106 percent (StatisticsNorway, 2010). According to 
Meyer (Meyer, 1995:151), “[…] good natural experiments are studies in which there is a 
transparent exogenous source of variation in the explanatory variables that determine the 
treatment assignment”. The fact that the financial crisis of 2008 did not originate in Norway 
increases the exogenous dimension of the shock on Norwegian firms and thus makes it an 
appropriate empirical setting for our research question.  
 
3.1.1 Data  
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To study the effect of changes in demand and access to credit on firms’ boundary decisions, 
we combined data from an extensive questionnaire about the effects of the recent financial 
crisis on Norwegian firms with publicly available secondary financial data. The questionnaire 
was constructed based on a literature review and went through a number of revision rounds 
before a complete draft was tested on 12 CEOs to make sure that the questions were clearly 
phrased and to avoid ambiguities. The final questionnaire was divided into three sections. The 
first section focused on issues regarding the pre-crisis period, the second on how firms were 
affected by the recession and how they responded to it, while the third focused on firms’ 
expectations for the future. 
 
3.1.2 Sample 
We excluded a number of firms and industries from our sample frame to make the empirical 
setting as representative as possible of the population of Norwegian firms. Cut off limits were 
set on the basis of 2007 data, the year before the crisis, and included the following.  First, we 
removed firms with an annual turnover lower than NOK 10 million (approximately $ 1.7 
million) to avoid very small firms to dominate the sample and to exclude holding and real 
estate firms with no day-to-day operations. Second, we removed firms with labor and social 
expenses lower than NOK 3 million (approximately $ 0.5 million) to ensure that the firms at 
least had a few employees. Setting a limit on number of employees would be preferable, but 
unfortunately not possible as the employee variable in the registry data was incomplete. Third, 
we excluded all state owned firms, as these are less likely to be motivated by profits, and fifth, 
we removed a total of 13 two-digit NACE-industries that were believed to disturb the 
generality of the sample. Industries from the finance and insurance sector were removed as 
their financial reporting tends to differ from that of other firms, while the agriculture, health 
and culture sectors were removed as their close connections to the public sector make them 
less likely to experience normal market forces or to be motivated by profits. This left us with 
the total sample frame of 17.312 firms from which 5000 firms were randomly selected to 
receive the questionnaire. The survey was distributed to the CEO of these firms in November 
2010, with two reminders being sent out in December 2010. The data collection was 
completed at the end of January 2011 with a total of 1248 usable responses, yielding a 
response rate of 25 %. However, due to missing data on one or more of the variables used in 
this study reduced the effective sample to 1130 respondents. 
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 3.1.3 Data concerns 
A number of potential biases are present when using survey data. First, we may have 
respondent biases, e.g. that the firms that answered the survey are different from the firms that 
did not answer it. To investigate if this was the case, we used register data to check if the 
firms that responded differ from the sample of 5000 firms that received the questionnaire. 
Differences were checked on a number of variables, including size, pre-crisis growth, pre-
crisis debt ratio, pre-crisis profitability, pre-crisis total assets, geography, industry, ownership, 
age and legal form. We found no indications of any respondent biases. Second, as our survey 
data is retrospective, an obvious concern is biases associated with the accuracy of the memory 
of the respondents. Unfortunately, there is no way we can check for such biases but as the 
questionnaire was sent out relatively close up to the recession, we have, hopefully, minimized 
this problem. Further, it seems little likely that memory biases are distributed across firms in 
any systematic way, which implies that potential biases will appear in our data as random 
sources of error. Also, outsourcing/insourcing activities are decisions so considerable for a 
firm that the likelihood of the CEOs to remember that they have done so should be very high. 
Third, our data is also vulnerable to single respondent biases as there was only one respondent 
in each firm, the CEO. This is problematic if there are any systematic biases of CEOs’ 
responses, such as self-serving bias where poor performance is blamed on the recession. But 
again, the uncontroversial nature of in/outsourcing decisions makes this less of a problem. 
Fourth, our data is also vulnerable to survivor biases as the survey was distributed only to 
surviving firms and not to the firms that disappeared during the recession. The most 
vulnerable and adversely hit firms are therefore underrepresented in our data.   
 
3.2 Variables and Measurement Development 
3.2.1 Dependent variables 
We had three dependent variables measuring actions related to changes in firm boundaries, 
namely outsourcing of core activities (OUT_CORE), outsourcing of non-core activities 
(OUT_NCORE) and insourcing of core activities (IN_CORE). All three are binary, and were 
constructed based on the following questions in the questionnaire: “Have the crisis made your 
firm change which activities that are performed within the firm (insourcing and outsourcing? 
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If yes, please specify”. Then the firms could choose between the categories “Outsourced 
production activities”, “Outsourced administrative/ support activities”, “Insourced production 
activities (that used to be bought in the market)” and “insourced administrative/ support 
activities (that used to be bought in the market)”. To each of these four questions, respondents 
could choose between the three categories “Yes, within the firms core activities”, “Yes, 
outside the firm’s core activities” and “No”. The firms that answered yes to one or both of the 
two questions regarding outsourcing where given the value 1 for the two variables 
OUT_CORE and OUT_NCORE respectively, while the others were given the value zero. 
Similarly, firms that answered, “yes, within core activities” to one or two of the questions 
regarding insourcing were given the value 1 for the variable IN_CORE.  
Our three dependent variables make no distinctions between different types of activities other 
than whether the firms themselves regard them as core to the firms operations or not. This 
leaves us with an empirical definition of outsourcing as the act of moving hitherto firm-
internal economic activities outside the boundaries of that firm and in-sourcing as the act of 
moving economic activities conducted across markets within the boundary of a firm. This is a 
very general definition that only leaves out boundary changes that follow from decisions to 
expand or reduce the scale of existing capacity. Frequency tables for the three dependent 
variables are presented in table 1.  
 [INSERT TABLE 1 HERE] 
 
3.2.2 Independent variables 
We had two independent variables, changes in access to credit and changes in demand, of 
which both where based on questions from on the questionnaire. Changes in access to credit 
was based on a question where the respondents rated how their access to credit were affected 
by the crisis on a scale from -3 (reduced) to + 3 (increased) with 0 indicating no change. The 
scale was then reversed so the higher value of the variable, the more reductions in access to 
credit the firm experienced. Changes in demand were constructed by summing up two items 
from the survey on how the crisis had affected the demand for the firms’ products and 
services and how it had affected their capacity utilization. The two scales ranged from -3 
(reduced) to +3 (increased) with 0 indicating no change. The two items was then summed up 
and reversed so that the higher value of the variable, the more reductions in demand a firm 
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experienced. To avoid multicollinearity problems when testing interaction effects, both 
variables were mean centered (Cohen, Cohen, West, & Aiken, 2003).  
 
3.2.3 Control variables 
As control variables, we included five pre-recession firm- and industry characteristics. Firm 
profits and firm leverage are measured as the industry adjusted operating profits and debt-to-
total assets in 20073. To avoid extreme values on the firm profits variable to interfere with our 
results, this measure were trimmed by excluding firms with profits larger than +/- two 
standard deviations from the mean. This operation excluded a total of 40 firms. All analyses 
where conducted both with and without this operation, and it had no substantial effects on the 
results other than improving model fit and the statistical significance of the firm profit 
variable. Firm size is measured as the natural logarithm of number of employees in 2007, and 
was collected from the questionnaire. Further, we included two controls on vertical bargaining 
power. These were each based on a seven point likert scale items from the survey where firms 
evaluated the degree to which their customers- and providers could influence terms and 
conditions such as prices, delivery, terms of payment etc.  
The means, standard deviations and correlations of all independent variables are shown in 
table 2 below. 
[INSERT TABLE 2 HERE] 
 
3.3 Statistical Approach 
Given the dichotomous nature of our dependent variables, we use binary logistic regressions 
to test our hypotheses. The general model is the following:  
(1) Logit Y = α + β1 Reductions in demand + β2 Reductions in access to credit + 
                         β3- β 7 Controls + ε 
Logit Y is the natural logarithm of the odds that a firm actually has insourced/outsourced 
activities: 
3 2-digit NACE codes were used 
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(2) ln [p(Y = 1) / (1 − p(Y = 1)] 
We test the interaction effect predicted by hypotheses 6 by including an interaction term 
between reductions in demand and –access to credit in equation 1. To further investigate the 
interaction effect, we test conditional effects of the focal predictor at values of a moderator 
variable using Hayes and Matthes’ (2009) modprobe macro for SPSS. This method allows for 
using both a pick-a-point approach (Aiken & West, 1991; Cohen et al., 2003) and the Johnsen 
Neyman technique (Johnson & Fay, 1950) to test conditional effects.  The pick-a-point 
approach involves selecting different values of the focal predictor (e.g. high, low and 
moderate) and we use this method to generate data for graphical visualization of the 
interaction. We use the Johnson-Neyman technique to estimate regions of statistical 
significance for the interaction effects.  
 
4. Results 
We ran three different logistic regressions models with each of the three dependent variables, 
one only including the controls (model A), one including the controls and independent 
variables (model B) and one which also included an interaction term between the independent 
variables (Model C).  
First we used outsourcing of non-core activities (OUT_NCORE) as the dependent variable. 
Model 1a consists of the five control variables and a constant, and the model significant on a 
0.05 level with a chi-square value of 11.988 and a pseudo R2 of 0.031. Model 1b adds the two 
independent variables to the equation, and is significant on a 0.01 level with a Chi-square 
value of 20.116 and a pseudo R2 of 0,052. H1 predicted that reductions in demand would be 
positively related to outsourcing of non-core activities. From the results we see that the 
coefficient is positive, but marginally insignificant on a 0.05 level (P-value=0.051). H1 is thus 
only partially supported. Also, we see that reductions in access to credit do not have any 
significant effect on the outsourcing of non-core activities, which is just what we expected.  
Next, we used outsourcing of core activities (OUT_CORE) as the dependent variable. Model 
2a consists of the five control variables and a constant, and is significant on a 0.01 level with 
a Chi-square value of 20.682 and a pseudo R2 of 0.055. Model 2b adds the two independent 
variables to the equation, and is significant on a 0.01 level with a Chi-square value of 46.146 
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and a pseudo R2 of 0,121. H2 and H4 predicted that reductions in demand and reductions in 
access to credit would both be positively related to outsourcing of core activities. We see that 
the two coefficients are indeed positive and significant on a 0.01 level, which makes us 
conclude that H2 and H4 are supported.  
Then, we use insourcing of core activities (IN_CORE) as the dependent variable. Similar to 
above, Model 3a consists of the five control variables and a constant, and is significant on a 
0.05 level with a Chi-square value of 14.029 and a pseudo R2 of 0.043. Model 3b adds the two 
independent variables to the equation and the model is statistically significant on a 0.01 level 
with a Chi-square value of 29.048 and a pseudo R2 of 0,089. H3 and H5 predicted that 
reductions in demand and reductions in access to credit both would be positively related to 
outsourcing of core activities, which is exactly what we find. Both coefficients are positive 
and significant on a 0.05 level, and we conclude that H3 and H5 are supported.  
Model 3c adds an interaction term between the two independent variables and the model is 
statistically significant on a 0.01 level with a Chi-square value of 32.977 and a pseudo R2 of 
0,101. H7 predicted that there would be a negative interaction between reductions in demand 
and reductions in access to credit on insourcing of core activities. The interaction term is 
indeed negative and statistically significant on a 0.05 level, and its inclusion in the model 
added explanatory power to model by increasing the pseudo R2 from 0.091 to 0.101. These 
findings indicate that H6 is supported. Further, the two main effects are also statistically 
significant on a 0.01 level, indicating that both of the variables have a statistically significant 
effect on the probability that a firm will insource core activities when the other has the value 
of zero.  
[INSERT TABLE 3 HERE] 
 
To further investigate the interaction term, we test for conditional effects of the focal predictor 
(reductions in demand) for different values of the moderator (reductions in access to credit). 
First we use a pick-a-point approach to visualize the interaction graphically (Figure 1). For 
illustrative purposes, we pick values for the “highest”, “lowest” and “no-change” categories 
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of the reductions-in-access-to-credit-variable and then plot the conditional effects of changes 
in demand on the probability of insourcing4.  
[INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE] 
From figure 1 we clearly see the negative moderation effect of access to credit on reductions 
in demand. For higher levels of problems accessing credit, the effect of reductions in demand 
on the probability of insourcing becomes smaller. The next step is to investigate the regions of 
significance for the interaction effect. Table 4 shows that of the three values of access to 
credit plotted in figure one, only the lowest and the medium categories are statistical 
significant. Table 5 shows a Johnson-Neyman estimation of regions of significance, and from 
the table we see that the moderation is statistical significant for values of access to credit in 
the interval [-3.3, 0.9], while it is not statistically significant for the highest problems 
accessing credit. The upper limit of statistical significance, 0.9, is equivalent to a value of 5.2 
without the mean centering (1-7 scale). It is somewhat surprising that the interaction term is 
not statistical significant for the highest levels of reductions in access to credit. However, as 
the effect is statistical significant for moderate levels of problems accessing credit, we 
maintain the conclusion that hypothesis 6 is supported.  
[INSERT TABLES 4 AND 5 HERE] 
Finally, we inspected residual diagnostics and tested the assumptions underlying logistic 
regression to assess the quality of our models. To look for cases with poor model fit we 
investigated the studentized- and standardized residuals, and to check whether any cases had a 
very large influence on our models we inspected influence statistics such as the Cook’s 
distance and Leverage. Further, we tested for the linearity of the logit and multicollinearity. 
None of these inspections yielded any reasons for concern regarding our models. 
 
5. Discussion and Conclusion 
We used a dataset combining primary survey data with secondary financial data for a sample 
of 1.130 Norwegian firms to investigate how reductions in demand and -in access to credit 
4 The category-values of the access to credit variable shown in figure 1 deviates from the 1-7 likert scale values 
described in the methods section because we mean centered them before estimating the conditional effects. The 
values -.3.3, -0.3 and 2,7 are thus the equivalent to 1 (increased access to credit), 4 (no change in access to 
credit) and 7 (reduced access to credit), respectively. 
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affect in- and outsourcing of core/non-core activities. To test our hypotheses we applied a 
series of logistic regressions.  
Our first set of hypotheses was related to how reductions in demand affect out- and 
insourcing. First, we tested how it affected outsourcing of non-core activities, and found a 
positive and almost statistically significant relationship (p-value of 0,051). Hypothesis one 
was thus only partially confirmed. The hypothesis was based on two different arguments 
derived from the Coasian and the transaction cost perspective respectively. Our results are in 
congruence with both of the theoretical arguments, but unfortunately they do not allow us to 
make a clear distinction between which of the causes are at work.   
Second, we tested hypothesis two and three on how reductions in demand affected 
outsourcing and insourcing of core activities. We found positive and significant relationships 
regarding both hypotheses. The theoretical reasoning behind these two hypotheses was that 
reductions in demand increase uncertainty (behavioral, environmental or both), and that this 
again affects firms’ incentives to take actions regarding which activities they perform within 
their boundaries. While the Coasian perspective only indicates that firms tend to insource 
more as uncertainty increase the transaction cost perspective indicated firms may both in or 
out-source activities. Thus, our findings of reductions in demand being positively related to 
both in- and outsourcing are in congruence with Williamson’s (1986) proposition that firms 
can respond to uncertainty by either integrating vertically or by sacrificing specificity in favor 
of more standardized goods and services.  
Our second set of hypotheses stated how increases in cost of finance affect in- and 
outsourcing. We found no statistically significant relationship between reductions in access to 
credit and outsourcing of non-core activities, which was just as expected. Regarding core 
activities, we hypothesized that reductions in access to credit should be positively related to 
both outsourcing and insourcing of activities, which was also what we found.   
The theoretical reasoning behind the effect of reduced access to credit on outsourcing can be 
found in the work of both Williamson and Coase. The transaction cost perspective points to 
increased riskiness of transaction specific investments as a reason why firms undertake more 
general type investments and outsource activities. The Coasian perspective directs attention of 
the increased cost of investment failures within the boundaries of the firm as a reason to 
expect out sourcing. At the same time one can also expect market agents to face decreasing 
incentives to undertake investments in transactions that support firm core activities. The 
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reason for this is that they too have higher cost of making mistakes and that they are more 
likely to make such mistakes compared to managers with insight knowledge. Our findings of 
reduced access to credit having a positive effect on the probability that firms insource core 
activities are in line with both arguments, but again we cannot say which is more relevant.  
Our last interest was in the interaction effect of reductions in demand- and access to credit on 
insourcing on core activities. Here we hypothesized that reductions in demand would increase 
firms’ incentives to vertically integrate core activities, but that the relationship would be 
moderated by reductions in access to credit. So, if a firm experience reductions in access to 
credit in addition to reductions in demand, this should hinder its ability to vertically integrate. 
Hypothesis six was confirmed, although the interaction effect was not statistical significant 
for the highest levels of reductions in access to credit. The negative interaction effect is an 
interesting finding as it may shed lights on the somewhat ambiguous theoretical predictions of 
whether firms respond to reduced demand by integrating vertically or by sacrificing 
specificity and outsource an activity to the market. Firms’ access to credit may therefore be a 
factor that determines which one of the two options that are chosen. So while the incentives to 
vertically integrate is increased due to the increased uncertainty accompanied by reductions in 
demand, the ability to do so depends on the firms access to credit to finance the integration. It 
would have been preferable to have alternative measures of access to credit to further 
investigate the interaction effect. One such measure could have been to combine pre-recession 
debt-levels with survey questions related to if firms changed their sources of finance during 
the recession, but unfortunately such questions were not included in the survey. Anyhow, our 
subjective measure of “access to credit” is a more direct measure of reduced access to external 
finance than pre- or in-recession levels of debt captured from accounting data, as it directly 
captures problems accessing capital for investments firms want to pursue and not only 
investments already undertaken.   
The findings outlined above have several theoretical implications. First, as advocated by Foss 
(2010) they emphasize that more focus should be given towards studying how radical changes 
on macro levels, such as recessions, affect firms’ boundary decisions. Second, several of the 
findings highlight the importance of access to finance when studying changes in firm 
boundaries. The negative interaction effect between demand- and credit problems on 
insourcing of core activities indicate that financing issues may influence firms’ boundary 
decisions under periods of increased uncertainty.  Future research should, however, go more 
in detail on the mechanisms at play regarding how demand- and credit problems affect firms’ 
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in- and outsourcing, and also look further into the role of access to finance as a moderator of 
demand problems on firms’ boundary decisions. The latter should be studied in more detail 
both in “normal times” and in times of severe recessions to investigate how the relationships 
might change depending on the stability of the business environment.  
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Table	  1	  Frequencies	  Dependent	  Variables
Frequency	   Percent	   Frequency	   Percent	   Frequency	   Percent	  
0 1186 95,0 1182 94,7 1199 96,1
1 62 5,0 66 5,3 49 3,9
Total	   1248 100,0 1248 100,0 1248 100,0
In_CoreOut_Core Out_Ncore
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Table 2  Means, standard deviatons and correlation coefficients of independent variables 
Mean Std. Deviation 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1. Firm profits 2007 ,014 ,069 1
2. Firm leverage 2007 -,018 ,246 -.231*** 1
3. Firm Size 3,232 1,017 -.019 -.017 1
4. Bargaining power downstream 3,980 1,601 .075*** -.031 -0.077*** 1
5. Bargaining power upstream 4,166 1,446 -..003 -.020 .006 -.188*** 1
6. Reductions in access to credit 4,300 1,031 -.068** .033 .101*** -.004 .035 1
7. Reductions in demand 9,635 2,358 .000 -.012 .128*** -.027 .038 .278*** 1
***, **, and * represent statistical significance (2-tailed), at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels respectively. 
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The economic theory of the firm offers conflicting predictions of how the two major 
effects of recessions, changes in demand and access to credit, affect firm boundaries. 
Using data on Norwegian firms in the recent recession, we find support for both 
increased- and reduced vertical integration of core activities in response to such 
changes. Further, we find that access to credit negatively moderates the effect of 
reductions in demand on vertical integration. The latter finding may highlight a 
possible explanation for the conflicting theoretical predictions.
